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THE POLITICS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY* 
Frank Webster 
'. . . the unfortunate thing is that at present the word "progress" and the word 
"Socialism" are linked inseparably in almost everyone's mind. . . the Socialist is 
always in favour of mechanisation, rationalisation, modernisation. . .' 
George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, (1937). 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967, p. 176. 
'. . . intellectuals must a@rm outright, without qualification or hesitation progress 
is a lie. Only then will people be able to think, say, and act upon what they 
already know, without fear of isolation, ridicule, or repression. Responsible 
intellectuals. . . must struggle in their own realm to gain legitimacy for worker 
resistance to progress. They must change the terms of debate and extend the 
range of respectable discourse in order to insure that those who choose to resist 
need never act alone.' 
David F. Noble, Present Tense Technology, Part Three, Democracy 4(3)1983:87. 
Introduction 
A recent article explains how one of the most militant workforces in the 
country, car workers at British Leyland's Longbridge plant, came to have 
its spirit of resistance broken. There are several reasons: the failure to 
mobilise members in response to  the sacking of the union convenor late in 
1979, the aggressive management tactics of Michael Edwardes, mass un- 
employment, the combativity of the Thatcher government. . . However, 
what the authors of this New Society piece single out as 'the real turning 
point' was the introduction of new technology which forced on the unions 
'flexibility' by deskilling jobs, massively increasing output, and introducing 
an electronic information network called Machine Monitoring System that 
resulted in much greater surveillance of individual employees.' 
The BL unions offered no significant opposition to  the robots, computer 
numerical control systems and electronic supervision technologies that 
brought this into being because, say Scarbrough and Moran, 'new tech- 
nology enjoys an important status as an inherently progressive force in 
society. Few if any trade unions. . . are willing to risk the accusation of 
being "Luddites" in relation to technology'. It was this 'mystique of 
technology' that the Longbridge management was able to exploit to  over- 
come labour resistance to innovations that would seriously undermine 
*Thanks to Keith Lambe and Ralph Miliband for their criticisms of earlier drafts 
of this article. 
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the power of the shopfloor. 
The unions scarcely stood a chance. So ensnared in the ideology of 
'technological progress' were they that 'Even the shop stewards on the 
Works Committee-notable for their communist sympathies-sought to  
protect it (new technology) from the plant's industrial relations problems'. 
And what option did they have given the fact that the 'alternative plan' 
put forward by the stewards' combine in the 1970s 'had made massive 
investment in new production facilities the centrepiece of its approach'? 
Not surprisingly, 'when the investment actually materialised at the plant 
in 1980, the unions could hardly stand on their heads and oppose its 
introduction'. 
The Longbridge episode focuses a recurrent dilemma for the Left: how 
can it reconcile an attitude towards technology which regards it as 
inherently progressive with the fact that it is used and is being used as a 
weapon against labour? The urgency of finding a resolution to this puzzle 
can hardly be overstated since we are living through a period of particular- 
ly intense technological change. Computer communications technologies 
are the leading edge of this movement, but i t  also includes genetic engineer- 
ing, nuclear power and biotechnology. Indeed, technological innovation is 
today a privileged means of effecting social, economic, and even political 
change and until the Left establishes a clear and confident technology 
policy it will be condemned to dithering, to wringing its hands a t  the 
results of technological adoption which favours the powerful while help- 
less to resist its implementation because it is approving of the 'progress' 
the technology itself represents.' 
It is in response to this situation that this article sets out to: 
- examine the Left's perception of technology and explain why it 
impairs resistance to changes that favour capital. 
- argue that if the Left wants to influence changes decisively it needs 
to  reconceive technology in a way that allows it to understand 
adequately the key role of technology in attempts to restructure 
relations so that capital might escape recession and, as important, 
t o  appreciate the influence social relations have had on the develop- 
ment of technologies currently being introduced. 
- urge that the Left should thoroughly politicise technology and 
technological innovation, from the point of application back to  
origination, and in so doing to develop and implement socialist 
priorities and procedures to guide technological change. 
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The Left's perception of technology 
The dominant assumption of the Left is that technology is neutral and 
consequently amenable to use or abuse depending on who exercises 
political power. Thus while capitalism might abuse technology in service 
of private interests and market injustices, the arrival of socialism will lead 
to positive use of technology for the community as a whole. 
This attitude is evident in much Left thinking. I t  is present in the 
writing of Marx and Engels where they rage against capitalist misuse of 
machines to  exploit working people, but foresee a time when these same 
technologies can be 'transformed from master demons into willing 
 servant^'.^ I t  is prominent in the Labour Party which argues that a 
Thatcher government 'is the worst possible background for the adoption 
of new technology', though directed by Kinnock it 'could create a historic 
stage in the development of a socialist caring ~ o c i e t y ' . ~  And it received 
perhaps its classic statement in Harold Wilson's 1963 'white heat' speech 
which, contrasting Tory and Labour policies, offered voters 'the choice 
between the blind imposition of technological advance, with all that 
means in terms of unemployment, and the conscious, planned, purposive 
use of scientific progress'.' 
This emphasis on the malleability of technology co-exists with the 
equally widespread conviction that a certain amount of technology is a 
prerequisite of socialism. Drawing on Marx's view that socialism would be 
viable only after the 'struggle for necessity' (for food, shelter, clothing. . .) 
had been won, and endorsing his assertion that the capitalist stage of 
development preceded socialism not least because by 'revolutionising 
the instruments of production' i t  would secure a material basis for social- 
ism, there is on the Left a presumption that some degree of technological 
uptake is essential t o  lay the foundations for a new order. 
This outlook results in what might be called an inheritor approach to  
technologies pioneered by capitalism. There are no qualms about taking 
over capitalist technologies because technology is amenable to socialist 
application, though they are also a precondition for socialism since there 
cannot be any satisfactory poIitics while people are hungry, naked, or in 
general want. 
These principles evoke a paradox which bedevils the Left: technology 
is supposed to be susceptible to political manipulation, yet it is, in a real if 
unspecified sense, prior to  social and political relations, since without a 
technological infrastructure life is governed by a raw and ungenerous 
nature. The presumption here, at  one and the same time, is that while 
technologies are determined for good or ill by social and political decisions, 
imperatives of technology adequate to  satisfy basic needs determine social 
and political relations. 
There are a number of consequences of this tradition of thought. A 
major one is that it leads to vacillation towards technological innovation. 
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I t  could scarcely be otherwise given the Left's conviction that technology 
of itself is aloof from politics. Moreover, since technology is also essential 
for laying the basis for socialism, socialists can hardly rebel against its 
introduction. They can thunder against its misapplications, but they 
cannot be against the technology itself because come socialism it will be 
used advantageously. This is surely the reason for the undercurrent of 
celebration of capitalism's dynamism that runs through The Communist 
Manifesto. 
An upshot is regular condemnation of 'mindless Luddites' by many on 
the Left when vigorous opposition is voiced towards technological innova- 
tion (it goes without saying that this is a favoured refrain of the Right)- 
viz Wilson's cri de coeur that 'there is no  room for Luddites in the Socialist 
and, more recently, Jimmy Reid's denunciation of opposition to 
pit closures as 'Luddite' and thus 'thoroughly reactionary' since it fails to 
'view modern technology as a liberating f ~ r c e ' . ~  Equally common is a 
resigned feeling of 'inevitability' t o  changes spearheaded by technology 
though they are recognised by the Left as damaging to their cause. The 
overall result is that resistance to change favourable to capital is disarmed.' 
A second consequence is that, if technology is essential for the socialist 
enterprise and if it can be inherited from capitalism, then to what extent 
are we to submit to the social relations, and the quality of those relations, 
that the technology imposes? This is a particularly acute question when 
set against the technologies associated with large-scale manufacture and 
bureaucratic organisation which characteristically result in workers feeling 
alienated, bored and demeaned. If one accepts the view that technologies 
are simply efficient means of guaranteeing output which yet impose them- 
selves in particular divisions of labour and authority relations, then are we 
resigned just to accept them? If we do, and much of the reasoning of the 
Left leads one to this conclusion, then what is the attraction of socialism 
for ordinary workers and where have the socialist ideals of egalitarianism 
and an end to alienation gone? 
A third consequence, related to the second, revolves around the popular 
socialist notion that a decrease in the working day is an assured route to 
socialism, and that this can be achieved by application of technology 
which allows at  once increases in production and reductions in time spent 
a t  work. This is a theme well known to  socialists, one found in the writings 
of Marx and Engels themselves, and most recently espoused by Andre 
GO=.' I t  does allow the Left to retain the idea that technology, though 
developed by capitalism, is neutral, and to  acknowledge that, whatever the 
social system, it imposes unpleasant conditions on workers. Its resolution 
is delightfully straightforward: apply still more technology so that what 
Gorz calls the 'sphere of autonomous activity', and others call leisure, 
can be massively extended. 
However, what this must then encounter is the serious problem concern- 
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ing the extent to which technology per se-the technology which is 
essential for socialism though created by capitalism-can lead to socialism. 
And this is not a frivolous issue given the deluge of futurist comment 
projecting precisely this-material plenty without the need to work, a 
Leisure Society awash with goods and services that are abundantly avail- 
able to  everyone-'without the long-awaited revolution of the proletariat'.g 
Socialists, for long accepting as a truism that technology is crucial for 
socialism, without stipulating just how much it shapes social arrangements, 
cannot complain when conservatives steal their fire by discovering in new 
technology the possibility of 'socialism' without political change because 
the technology will effortlessly take us to  the 'affluent redundancy' of an 
'Athens without Slaves'. Neither can socialists respond with vigour to 
technological innovations in the here and now that enforce leisure on 
working people so long as they conceive of socialism as a technologically 
supported idleness. 
Present tense technologies 
If ambivalence and hesitation are endemic to  the Left's traditional 
perception of technology at a time when it can least afford to be indecisive 
because we are undergoing the most rapid technological transformation in 
history, what is a more adequate way of seeing? This should entail switch- 
ing from conceiving of the abstraction TECHNOLOGY to stress that 
technologies exist in particular machines and objects that perform 
particular functions. I t  is important to  move away from the unwordly 
perception of technology currently held because, paradoxically, it is by 
starting with a generic notion which is thought to be subject to  use or 
abuse that, turning to the substantive, the Left finds itself encumbered by 
a theoretical legacy that makes i t  incapable of responding cogently and 
confidently to specific technologies. If we can focus attention on what 
David Noble calls 'present tense t e c h n ~ l o ~ i e s ' , ' ~  we can shift from what is 
an unreal yet incapacitating debate towards an analysis of what tech- 
nological changes practically represent and thereby towards a forthright 
programme of response. 
The point is that no-one is or can be against TECHNOLOGY since 
TECHNOLOGY does not exist. Given the ubiquity of technologies-and 
virtually nothing we do in our lives, from the mundane (writing letters, 
shaving, telephoning) to the spectacular (flying across Europe), is per- 
formed without them-it may well be that an all-encompassing category 
is useful as a shorthand way of communicating, but it is an unfortunate 
by-product that the generality of the term TECHNOLOGY means that 
debates about its social meaning are frequently conducted at an unreal 
level. It is rather like using the term SOCIETY: no-one can be against 
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SOCIETY because this term is so diffuse; move down to  particulars, 
however, to this social relation rather than that one, and very different 
conclusions may be drawn. 
Technology and capitalist restructuring 
Moving to the more concrete, we should acknowledge first of all that the 
primary rationale for technological change is to restructure British capital- 
ism that it might better compete internationally. Amid a profound recess- 
ion, the search is on to  find an escape, and reorganisation of production 
processes, manufacture of new products, and revised market strategies 
are axiomatic to this endeavour. The thrust of capital's effort is t o  take on 
board new technologies of various sorts, cheapen and/or improve pro- 
duction and distribution, and thereby capture an increased share of 
foreign markets. 
Technology is at the very forefront of this strategy of 'increasing 
competition' and 'restoring profitability' and it is a major reason why 
unions and their 'restrictive practices' must be broken since they represent 
a t  least potential obstacles to smooth and rapid adjustment. This is a 
message with which we are all familiar, one which Mrs Thatcher, backed 
by lavish propaganda campaigns in schools and media, voices in any and 
every speech which calls for 'rewarding entrepreneurs', 'hard work' and 
support for 'sunrise' industries which will supply the 'jobs of tomorrow'." 
Technology is, in short, at  the heart of the Thatcherite political offen- 
sive,12 and if the Left persists in appealing to its neutrality and holding 
to  the 'progress' of advances in the 'productive forces', then assuredly it 
will be without a serious response to  the assault. 
But this is exactly what the Labour Party continues to do. Rejecting 
Thatcher's commitment to laissez-faire development of new technology 
(which in practice the Tories do not altogether abide by), Labour insists 
on the need for state planning of innovation. This does distinguish it 
from the Conservatives, yet it shares their impulse to  introduce Informa- 
tion Technology in order to rejuvenate a market economy. Indeed, its 
criticism of Thatcher et  a1 is that they are not proceeding with technical 
innovation quickly enough compared to our major competitors. Thus 
John Smith MP, shadow industry spokesman: 
We've been taking a long hard look at the UK's industrial future and we've come 
to the clear conclusion that the key to industrial renewal is the rapid application 
of high technology. Our criticism is that it's not going fast enough.I3 
This is also the reasoning that we find in the TUC which urges that Britain 
responds to the 'challenge' of IT by being 'in the vanguard of technological 
change', so as to grasp 'the unique and unparalled opportunity.' . . for 
Britain to improve its economic performance and also its competitiveness 
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in world markets'.14 
The differences between the Labour and Conservative parties come 
down to the former's assertion that state orchestration is the best means 
of coping with the latest 'technological revolution' and its faith that a well- 
disposed state can distribute technology's bounty, which will be secured 
by making Britain's economy more competitive than that of other nations, 
to the less privileged. 
These are by no means insignificant differences between the parties and 
there is not the least doubt that a Labour administration would be more 
appealing to socialists, but it is necessary to  appreciate fully the implica- 
tions of Labour's approach to technology. In its acceptance of IT as a 
means of 'industrial renewal' as fast as is possible it is acceding to the 
terms set by the international market. It scarcely makes a secret of the 
matter. Mr Callaghan said as much late in 1978 when he averred that it was 
time Britain 'woke up to microelectronics', because if it did not 'and 
other major industrial countries' did, then 'the prospect for us will be one 
of stagnation and de~l ine ' . '~  Since then, Callaghan's words have been 
repeated in one form or another by innumerable Labour representatives. 
The Tories are more curt, but the niessage is the same: 'Automate or 
Liquidate'. 
Labour of course assumes that technological innovation is neutral, that 
there has been a 'discovery', and government should seize the opportunities 
presented. Following this logic, there can be no anxiety in steering techno- 
logical changes on lines befitting the international market. Quite the 
contrary, Labour is enthusiastic to get on with the job, wanting to mobilise 
all state resources to hand that we can more effectively compete in the 
struggle for market share. And within all of this, it presumes, technology 
stands aloof, the preserve of politics being restricted to distributing the 
unprecedented wealth that follows from a revitalised 'Britain Inc.' thanks 
to rapid adjustment to the 'microelectronics revolution'. 
But it is demonstrably the case that a technology policy guided by the 
principles of the market shapes the sort of technologies that are produced 
and applied. One consequence, for instance, is that many jobs are de- 
skilled and demeaned (and many others made redundant) because the 
principle underpinning the design and application of this technology 
rather than that one is 'how can we best the French, Japanese, Germans 
or Americans?' (and all these nations are operating on the self-same lines) 
and axiomatic considerations here are cheapening the costs of labour, 
controlling the labour process more effectively, and increasing the output 
of saleable goods and services. Another is that the technologies which 
get manufactured are those that are marketable rather than those that are 
socially needed (for example, in 1980 Thorn-EMI's chairman candidly 
opined that his company's 'decision to withdraw from medical electronics 
was [because] there appeared little likelihood of achieving profits in the 
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foreseeable future';16 for another example, where was the mass market for 
personal computers before the torrent of 'IT awareness' commercials 
convinced anxious parents that they were an investment in the educational 
and employment prospects of their children?). Still another consequence 
is that funding for research and development from which emanate as yet 
unirnagined technologies is directed towards projects with commercial 
potential rather than communal application-witness the A 3 5 0  million 
Alvey programme to pioneer 'fifth generation computers' which is 
explicitly tied to  corporate goals.17 
The outcome of Labour's presumption that conditions prevailing on 
the international market have no influence on the technology itself (the 
political variables being only the speed of uptake and distribution of the 
beneficence of growth) is that it is resigned to the 'inevitability' of accept- 
ing and indeed encouraging particular technologies whatever they might 
do to the workforce, unions or the number of unemployed. Given the fact 
that the advanced capitalist economies, entrapped in slump, 'are all look- 
ing to new technologies as the panacea'18 for capital's woes, Labour's 
assumptions place it in an impossible situation. Compelled to manage 
technological innovation on terms set by the international market, yet 
operating in the name of socialism, it must find itself imposing and 
stimulating changes which militate against its core constituencies and 
political ideals. 
Technologies embody social values 
Following from this, it is necessary to emphasise that technologies have 
not dropped out of the skies, though this is the implication of media 
portrayals of that weird and wonderful galaxy 'Silicon Valley'. They have 
been produced in social contexts where they have been subject to the 
values and priorities of particular groups which, in discernable ways, get 
embodied in these technologies. To make this sort of statement seems to 
upset people, many of them on the Left who, sensing the presence of 
'philosophical re~ativism', '~ insist that this is to reduce technology to a 
figment of the mind. I t  is nothing of the sort. But it is to assert, against 
those who proclaim that technology is amenable to use or abuse, that 
things are not nearly so straightforward because, in a constituted techno- 
logy, social values have been incorporated. This is certainly not to say 
that, in different circumstances, we cannot use the technologies created 
by capitalism. The fact of the matter is that, being in the world, we have 
to  make use of what is available and few artifacts are so determining that 
they cannot be put to some alternative uses. It is simply to say that, 
because technologies are practical products of the social world, they are 
shaped by that world and this limits the malleability of any technology 
that might be inherited. 
Let me give a few examples: 
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- Houses are artifices in which to live, find protection from the weather, 
rear one's children, and accommodate one's belongings. But can any- 
one believe that these are 'just places to live?' Can anyone who has 
ridden through a town on a bus or train, from the city centre through 
the suburbs and beyond, be unaware of the values that have been 
incorporated into the architecture of homes? And can anyone be un- 
aware of the intrusion of class inequalities into this housing (size of 
buildings, garages, location, brickwork, gardens, proximity to work 
etc)? Reflecting on the values that are manifest here can socialists be 
blind to the enormous difficulties that 'inheritance' of such techno- 
logies presents for an egalitarian order? Come socialism who will get 
the palaces in Bishop's Avenue, Hampstead, and who will be living in 
the council houses of Neasden? 
- Cars are one of the commonest technologies today: in the USA there 
were 122 million registered automobiles, one for every two persons, 
in 1980, with 87% of households owning a car and over half possess- 
ing two or more. They are a means of carrying people and things 
from one place to  another, but they are much more than a 'technical' 
transport device since they incorporate a multitude of social values 
such as family size, use of and attitude towards finite natural 
resources (they are highly wasteful of energy), tolerance of injuries 
and fatalities and enormous expense imposed on health services (in 
1981, 50,000 people were killed in car accidents in America), status 
and style (the Porsche, Mini, Mercedes. . .), modes of living and of 
work (home in the suburbs away from the place of work). 
Perhaps above all, the automobile'embodies a value which is 
opposed to provision of public transport and favours individual 
provision of the means of mobility. It is worth stressing that the 
boom in the private motor car on which so much of the economic 
success of the fifties and sixties relied, the coincidence of the dis- 
mantling of much of the railway network, and the hidden subsidy 
from the taxpayer for provision of roads, reflect a deep-seated 
aversion in our society to the creation and maintenance of a public 
transport system. And it should be added that this is a value reflected 
in a particular technolow aespite the fact that it is extraordinarily 
hard to see anything but the necessity of owning a car in many parts 
of Britain nowadays because buses and trains are woefully inadequate 
in large part as a result of the development of the private motor car. 
No-one would claim that a change in social relations would over- 
night abolish the car. But it is equally absurd to pretend that the car 
is but a neutral technology which, if abused in the here and now 
(driven too fast, driven under the influence of alcohol, driven often 
unnecessarily), will be taken over unchanged in a different order. 
It will certainly be used, and used in some ways differently, but over 
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time it will also change technically as it is shaped by changed values 
and priorities. 
- Much has been written in recent months about the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (commonly referred to as Star Wars), which aims to  
produce a system of computers and communications, co-ordinated 
with beam weapons, tied together by the most advanced space 
technologies. Costs are scarcely estimable, though early in 1985 
President Reagan requested nearly $4 billion for initial programmes 
and $30 billion for the first five years funding, and full costs are put 
a t  many times that. The Strategic Defence Initiative is but the most 
dramatic instance of the trend towards 'electronic warfare'-every- 
thing from AWACS (airborne warning and control systems), battle- 
field communications, 'smart weapons', radar-s~eking missiles, 
electronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, the 
militarisation of space, the launch, guidance and operation of 
nuclear weapons, to worldwide military communication networks- 
that characterises modem military and security affairs. 
As constituted these technologies incorporate values of distrust, 
paranoia, and aggression in their design as means of surveillance and 
destruction of people within and outside particular nations. No 
doubt there are some alternative uses to which might be put the 
plethora of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence 
systems strung around the globe, but surely the hope and conviction 
of socialists is that in a different regime most if not all will be 
redundant, unusable reminders of a totally different and repugnant 
way of life. 
- Numerous commentators, but most of all Harry Braverman and 
more recently David ~ o b l e , ~ '  have described ways in which the 
development of factory and office technologies have been shaped by 
an overriding distrust of the worker. Nowhere in the twentieth 
century have investors or engineers seriously considered creating 
machinery which might ennoble work. Throughout, the aim has 
been to maximise output while minimising the role of the worker 
who threatens, as a human being who is unpredictable, as an 
economic cost, and as someone with contrary interests, to interrupt 
that pursuit. This is a value that has been incorporated into much 
technical and technological organisation of modern industry (in the 
'factory office', in assembly line manufacture) and consequences 
of its relegation of the quality of the employee's life have been that 
workers have had imposed on them routine, mindless, fragmented 
and soul-destroying tasks. 
Information Technology 
The coinage of the term Information Technology (IT) to indicate a trend 
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towards the convergence of telecommunications and computers has been 
accompanied by all manner of speculation about the things that it might 
do. Invariably commentators present us with a list of the 'choices' now 
on offer. Barry Jones gives a typical formulation: 
Technology can be used to promote greater economic equity, more freedom of 
choice, and participatory democracy. Conversely, it can be used to intensify the 
worst aspects of a competitive society, to widen the gap between rich and poor, 
to make democratic goals irrelevant, and to institute a technocracy." 
This posing of choices thanks to  IT follows from the insistence of reviewers, 
Left and Right, that 'being just like any other technology, IT is intrinsically 
neither good nor bad. Everything depends on how the country adapts 
itself to using information t e ~ h n o l o g y ' ~ ~  which 'really is neutral'.23 From 
such a presupposition the language of choice is irresistible. 
These presentations are impossible to reply to because they refer 
persistently to  abstractions rather than to substantive technologies. The 
question whether one is for or against technology can only be answered 
in the affirmative in this formulation-who can oppose something which 
allows free choice? But a meaningful response can only be attained at the 
level of specific technologies; a t  the level of this technology performing 
this function for these ends because it is here that technologies exist. 
Moreover, continuously asserting at a rarefied height that IT provides 
choices here, there, and everywhere, paradoxically restricts real choice 
because it diverts attention from analyses of the realities of the intro- 
duction and development of information technologies which would enable 
meaningful decisions to be made. 
Let us focus on a number of substantive contexts into which computer 
communications technologies are being introduced that profoundly 
influence their form and content. 
(a) Corporate Requirements 
Above all other factors should be emphasised the large, predominantly 
transnational, corporations that are the major outlets for IT systems which 
account for the bulk of 'electronic office' technologies and computer net- 
works. The advanced capitalist societies, domestically and internationally, 
are dominated by oligopolistic corporations that have particular and 
pressing informational needs to  which a variety of IT responds. They 
require co-ordination and organisation over wide geographical boundaries 
and it is through new information and communication systems that these 
dispersed enterprises can be more effectively managed. 
They recognise the role of IT readily enough: witness Westinghouse 
Corporation (1983 revenue $9.5 billion) which says it straight, announcing 
that in 1981 
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An integrated worldwide strategic planning process was put in place, linking 
products and country planning efforts. A global communications center is being 
established to provide timely and detailed information for every part of the 
world. This centralization of planning and intelligence will give Westinghouse a 
competitive edge in the worldwide deployment of its  resource^.^^ 
Or listen to Mr E. Bradley Jones, president of Republic Steel, who describes 
the emergence of 'geo-economics' as 'a way of saying that the trading 
nations of the world are stepping up  their intermingling of resources, man- 
power, technology and capital', a process which blurs national boundaries 
and demands the movement of capital and information 'with growing ease 
and speed', calling for computer communications networks to facilitate 
the production of such things as the Ford Escort which is assembled in 
three countries from parts made in nine." 
It could be supposed that the 'discovery' of IT and its harmonious fit 
with the requirements of corporate capital are coincidental, but this 
would have great difficulty in accounting for the practical implementation 
of computer communications technologies in service of increasingly 
centralised yet simultaneously dispersed organisations. Without the likes 
of Citicorp's transnational banking and financial interests calling for 'a 
completely integrated market place capable of moving money and ideas 
to any place on the planet in a matter of seconds' there scarcely would 
be moves afoot to establish an Integrated Services Digital Network that 
would enable high speed switching of digital circuits between subscribers 
across nations. I t  would be folly to ignore the profound influence capital 
has had both on the designers and manufacturers of these technologies 
(which, in turn, having a keen eye on the most lucrative markets, have 
throughout oriented their products to the deepest purses) and on the 
creation of communications policies premised on market principles.26 
Any assumption that available technologies just happen to accord 
with the needs of capital would be hard pressed to explain how they are 
being developed to facilitate what has been called the 'productive de- 
centra~ization'~' that is a feature of an emerging 'new international 
division of labour', by which is meant the decentralisation of production 
around the globe and inside individual countries by increasingly centralised 
corporate concerns that can monitor and instruct from distant locations 
small and isolated units (e.g. plant is located in the Far East or Caribbean 
and/or on the metropolitan fringes such as Southern Ireland and Scotland 
where labour is cheap and poorly organised)." 
In addition, as data networks emerge they take on specific characteristics. 
Drawing together information about natural resources, financial conditions, 
political circumstances, labour supply and so on, the boom in data bases 
and on-line information services in recent years has overwhelmingly 
indicated the values of the international market. The rise and rise of 
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'information factories' from Reuters, TRW, Quotron, Dun and Bradstreet, 
ITT, IBM and Dow Jones and the predominantly economic and financial 
data they harvest and sell are traceable directly to  the requirements of 
advanced capitalism. It is not only that the commodities these concerns 
trade in are specific to  corporate interests (what would socialists want to  
know about the value of the yen in real time? what would socialists care 
about Wall Street fluctuations as they happen?), but also that they are 
priced way out of the range of socialists' pockets (for example, the services 
offered by Reuters to 400 or so brokers and bankers cost an estimated 
L1,250 subscription plus E600 per month). 
It is, in sum, the need of corporate capital to monitor and manage its 
affairs which requires particular types of computer communications 
technologies and this receives a willing answer from profit-hungry IT 
manufacturers and servicers. This is the only way to  make sense of the 
world's leading telecommunications corporation which advertises that 
'At AT&T it is gospel that business strategy dictates system design'. And 
it is from this set of social relations that emanate most problems associated 
with electronic funds transfer, transborder data flows, and questions of 
national sovereignty being ~ n d e r m i n e d . ~ ~  
(b) From Taylorism to Social Taylorism 
The character of present day technological innovation might be better 
understood by sketching pressures that have been exercised throughout 
the development of corporate capitalism. A striking feature of the twentieth 
century has been the search for better control of its operations by the 
corporation, an endeavour that has increased in ambition as the company 
has spatially advanced and penetrated deeper into the fabric of social life. 
It has resulted in the spread of more calculative, methodical and deliberate 
ways of conducting social and economic affairs, and it has led to  life being 
more conscious1 and systematically regulated, more distinctly managed, 
than in the past. 3b 
The major applications of this control originated and still are found in 
the sphere of work where F.W. Taylor's 'Scientific Management' instigated 
what business guru Peter Drucker sees as the real 'information revolution' 
because it recognised that careful observation and analysis of labour pro- 
cesses, followed by precise planning, could lead to  more effective control 
of the workforce and leaps in productivity. 
If Taylor commenced and put a name to  what is recognisably modern 
management practice within the plant, and if his strategy placed a novel 
emphasis on information gathering and manipulation to effect it, then 
technology soon emerged as Taylorism's primary expression in the highly 
automated assembly lines and associated unskilled labour of Henry Ford's 
factories since the design of such forms of production made manifest 
Ford's knowledge of car manufacture and how to make i t  least reliant on 
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employees by building skills into the machinery and line. 
The search for control was neither restricted to  the factory nor, from a 
later date, the office where IT facilitiates the 'Fordism of white collar 
work'. Another important area has been documented by chandler3' 
where he traces the merger in America of mass production and mass 
distribution as corporations grew in scale and vertically integrated, thereby 
replacing the play of market forces in the area of distribution with control 
by the 'visible hand' of 'managerial capitalism' which became responsible 
for co-ordinating, overseeing and assessing manufacture and distribution 
under one management roof. 
'Managerial capitalism' soon found pressing the impulse to control 
affairs beyond the workforce and the distribution of produce. It is not 
only that the application of calculation was unlikely to stop short of 
such a crucial stage as selling, but also that mass production of itself 
required mass consumption and continuity of production could not be 
assured if this was left entirely to customers' whims.32 For these reasons, 
by the second decade of the century procedures were developed to 
rationalise selling. Spearheaded by the auto industry, modem marketing 
was pioneered to to assure sales of cars, clothing, cigarettes, processed 3 foods and the like. 
Important aspects of this marketing were installment selling, used-car 
trade-ins, annual models and eye-catching packaging (the imperatives of 
selling palpably influenced the technology),34 and advertising and market 
research, the former to dissemble information, the latter to amass details 
of income, life-style, buying preferences etc. that could be scrutinised the 
better to manage consumers. There is a fascinating literature from the 
twenties and thirties advocating 'scientific' methods of research 'in dis- 
covering the public's wants and reactions to particular products',35 the 
techniques of which enormously stimulated the development of 'the 
electric sorting and tabulating machines'36 made by International Business 
Machines that were the forerunners of modern computers and IBM. 
Relatedly, advertising required mediums and quickly established dominance 
in radio and later television, with profound consequences for programming 
and the rapid spread of  receiver^,^' as a means of 'entering the homes of 
the nation through doors and windows, no matter how tightly barred, and 
delivering its message audibly through the loudspeaker wherever placed'.38 
In turn, there came about an acute need for accurate ratings to measure 
television's and radio's reach as an important facet of market re~earch.~' 
This application of Scientific Management first in the workshop, then to 
the expanding corporation, and finally to the consumer can appropriately 
be called Social Taylorism, the extension of Taylorism throughout society. 
I t  is certainly the case that the garnering of information, and planning by 
management on the basis of what is gathered together, has grown 
enormously this past fifty years.40 
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Applied to the 'information revolution' through .which we are allegedly 
living, it persists in an emphasis on applying new technologies to sell 
more effectively. Now, with the greater range and versatility of video, cable 
and satellite television, advertising and audience monitoring are rendered 
still more sophisticated. Far-sighted managements are turning to these new 
media to  promote their cause further, to burrow themselves still deeper 
into the texture of society. According to the J. Walter Thompson - 
Company, cable TV offers 'new or improved advertising opportunities':41 
for example, test marketing, direct response advertising, placing of 
advertising within specialist channels, home shopping services, sponsored 
programming, 'informercials'. What the new media allow is more advertis- 
ing, more specific and targeted advertising to particular groups. And it also 
offers closer than ever monitoring of the audience. Thus AGB, Britain's 
biggest market researcher, which amongst other things meters television 
viewing for BARB (Broadcasters Audience Research Board), 'is already 
envisaging the day when the street interview, even telephone questioning, 
will be a thing of the past. Through its Cable and Viewdata company, it 
has a national sample of 550 homes, which i t  quizzes through special 
viewdata sets. Apart from instant judgment on commercials, it can stretch 
into other media fields, like the respondents' magazine readership'.42 The 
same company's Peoplemeter has recently been introduced into the 
United States as a means of more precisely monitoring TV viewing (meters 
can show when a TV is switched on, Peoplemeter aims to  discover whether 
viewers are actually watching).43 
As an example of this strategy to control consumers, let us look at  one 
of the world's major advertising agencies, Saatchi and Saatchi (S&S). The 
business of S&S is to develop and perfect the techniques of selling required 
by corporate capital. To this end i t  is 'continually examining the results of 
research to bring [it] closer to the heart of what makes consumers tick- 
their wants, needs, desires, aspirations'.44 S&S is devoted to  'market 
research, attitude and image surveys, and new product testing' and to  
strengthen its observational capabilities it has just bought Yankelovitch, 
Skelly and White, a firm of social research analysts headed by an acclaimed 
statistician and social f~recas ter .~ '  
S&S monitors people with a particular client in mind, transnational 
corporations, the needs of which are leading to 'pan-regional and world 
marketing emerging at  the heart of business strategy'. Recognising their 
dominance of the world economy and drawn by their billion dollar 
advertising expenditure, S&S believes that in future 'research will be 
conducted to look for similarities between countries, not to seek out 
differences', that global marketing will require advertisers to  find a formula 
for commercials 'so deep in its appeal that it can transcend national 
borders previously thought inviolate'. 
Though global, this remit demands still more exact surveying of con- 
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sumers, a capacity to recognise that 'there are probably more social 
differences between Midtown Manhattan and the Bronx, two sectors of 
the same city, than between Midtown Manhattan and the 7th Arrondisse- 
ment of Paris'. What will be required is 'analysis of all demographic, 
cultural and media trends', so marketers 'can survey the world battlefield 
for their brands, observe the deployment of their forces, and plan their 
international advertising and marketing in a coherent and logical way'. 
S&S thus offers clients the prospect that people will be known on a world 
scale, so that what they will be allowed to know can be most effectively 
managed. 
S&S is all in favour of new technologies provided they are founded on 
commercial principles. Thus it argues that the BBC's licence should be 
limited and funds collected from private benefactors, and it is bullish 
about cable's prospects 'as an advertising medium [because of] its ability 
to attract audiences through selective programming aimed at  more clearly 
defined groups than the mass audience of the major networks. Multi- 
national advertisers with a specific target audience in each country will be 
able to reach their target segment through a cable channel concentrating 
on their specific interest'. 
All this, yet S&S aspires to be more than an advertisingagency. Realising 
that 'as multinational corporations grow in size and complexity so the 
marketing, organisation and strategic problems which face them become 
more closely linked', it has consolidated by moving into management 
consultancy (advisory work in strategic planning, employee recruitment 
and training etc.) and marketing services (sales promotion, public relations, 
corporate image etc.), intent on supplying, in the words of the Financial 
Times, 'everything a company may need for its internal-and external- 
communications'.46 
This suggests that the spread of Scientific Management goes beyond 
coordination of the dispersed corporation, more intensive marketing of 
products and observation of customers, all requiring IT to  allow the 
gathering, assessment and dissemination of information. Further changes 
in corporations, above and beyond growth, concentration and spatial 
relocation, have impelled them, as part of the planning procedures essential 
t o  the retention and advancement of their position, t o  enter into what can 
only be described as the Scientific Management of political life itself. 
Michael useem4' finds reason for this in a shift from 'managerial' to 
'institutional' capitalism, by which he means that the economy is 
dominated nowadays not only by large corporations, but also that these 
are more interconnected than ever before. A result is a 'consciousness of a 
generalized corporate outlook' (p. 5) guided by an 'inner circle' of corporate 
leaders that has led to the 'political mobilization of business' (p. 150) over 
the past decade or so. 
In this way capitalism has become more cohesive and better equipped 
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to have its views represented in politics and has taken steps to  ensure that 
this influence is systematised and regularised. In the days of the modern 
state, with widespread political regulation and considerable significance 
applying to governmental decisions, advanced capitalism has acknowledged 
the need-and with institutional capitalism has developed the basis-for 
effective and consistent political representation. Information and IT are key 
requirements of effecting this political mobilisation of business. 
One dimension is the spate of corporate and advocacy advertising that 
has emerged in the commercial media and another is the boom in sponsor- 
ship which will be increasingly important as a means of subsidising com- 
munications technologies. These are attempts to continue the unrestricted 
activity of business by image manipulation, but they pale when compared 
to the more directly political representation of corporations. On the one 
hand, this is evident in their recognition that 'better communications' 
within and without the organisation are a means of getting their own 
way-and the mushrooming of PR companies, the cultivation of media 
contacts, executive grooming for TV appearances, in-house video pro- 
ductions and the like express this. On the other hand, it is apparent in 
corporate involvement in politics itself. The unrelenting growth of the 
business lobby and full-time lobbyists within Westminster, with their 
indices of 'opinion leaders', computerised files on MPs and their colleagues, 
constant stream of press releases and targeted leaflets is testament to this. 
But still more significant is the intense support for and influence on pro- 
business parties themselves. Corporate conviction that politics must be 
better managed than before has been expressed not only in substantial 
support for and donations to conservative political parties, subsidy of 
pro-business 'think tanks', and more vigorous participation in politics by 
the CBI. I t  has also been witnessed in the development within the polity 
itself of business procedures. 
One can point to the ways in which S&S by its forays into the elections 
of 1979 and 1983 has bridged a traditional gap between politics and 
business by applying its expertise as a 'communicator' gained in selling 
products to  selling politicians. American politics are the epitome of this 
process of week in week out polling of the electorate, and computer 
analysis of patterns and past practices, so that candidates can be better 
'packaged',48 but S&S are an index of the way politics here has been 
changing to become a matter of 'selling' ideas and 'delivering' votes, a 
sign that Scientific Management has entered politics itself. 
S&SYs campaign tactics and strategy are well known: the careful calcula- 
tion of people's attitudes and the moulding of candidates around issues so 
identified, the daily polls, the targeting.of posters, elocution lessons for 
Mrs Thatcher, meticulous selection of clothing and grooming of hair, 
prearrangement of 'photo-opportunities' and media 'events'. . . A corollary 
of this advertising mentality in politics is the excessive concern for secrecy 
402 THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1985186 
that characterises the Thatcher government.49 Another is the diminution 
of politics as a 'public sphere': the avoidance of serious political debate 
and exchange of ideas and principles and their replacement with slogans, 
image manipulation and news management. 
It is important to stress that it is this consolidation and extension of 
Taylorism that drives the 'information revolution'. This is especially so 
because people are easily wrong-footed by talk of 'choice' in a 'new era' 
heralded by innovative technologies. If we place the power, interests and 
motives of corporate capitalism at  the centre of developments and applica- 
tions we depict a very different scenario-and appropriate reaction to-the 
'Knowledge Society' which futurists, Left and Right, suggest is a radical 
break with the past. 
Arguing that a crucial context for take-up of information technology 
now and in the past is the search for increased corporate control, and that 
this impinges on the technologies themselves, is an important factor in 
retaining and sustaining hostility towards capitalist changes that are so 
often announced as 'technical progress'. One way of illustrating this is to 
point out that a good many of these technologies without corporate 
capitalism are worthless. Who on the Left could find use for S&S's data 
bases and market profiles; for the customised software housed in the 
headquarters of transnational corporations; for the 11,000 hours of 
TV soaps rumoured to be held in a vault in Texas awaiting the establish- 
ment of cable in Britain? Are socialists not disturbed by the accumulation 
of creditworthiness files on buyers which results from the spread of 
plastic cards (Access, Barclaycard, Visa) and is a major motive for Marks 
and Spencer's recent incursion into this area since it gives 'invaluable 
feedback and data concerning individual customers, their needs and their 
purchasing power'50 and will better allow future marketing efforts? 
A retort might be that these are aspects of IT'S applications, that they 
represent the 'software' which is socially skewed, but that the 'hardware' 
is what the Left can inherit because it is both valuable and malleable. 
There is of course some truth in this view, and I would not want to  suggest 
that technology should be approached in manichaean terms of usefull 
useless, but it is important to  grasp that values do intrude into the hard- 
ware itself. For example, the technologies that Taylorism has pioneered 
in factories and the work patterns they impose surely cannot be acceptable 
t o  socialists. Neither can the 'growth at all costs' (to people, the environ- 
ment) mentality that they express be endorsed. Again, it is striking that 
so much IT for the home is an enhancement of the television monitor, 
itself developed, as Raymond Williams has observed," as the 'box in the 
corner' toaaccord with the 'mobile privatisation' of modern family life. 
Video cassette recorders, TV games, home computers, satellite broad- 
casting and cable services all consolidate what has been an enormous 
commercial success, the television, and in so doing they perpetuate the 
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move towards privatisation that is characteristic of consumer capitalism 
and, indeed, express materially the plans of corporate designers. As a 
recent Campaign feature put it, new technologies for the home represent 
a shift t o  'Fortress Britain', a further withdrawal into the domestic sphere, 
equipping it with uantities of durables and pulling up the drawbridge on 
the world outsidJ2 (though communications facilities will enable the 
centralised observation of these isolated dwellings). While there are very 
important debates to  be conducted about whether this hardware is to be 
programmed commercially or from public funds, there is another issue, 
less openly acknowledged, which questions whether the styles of life 
embodied in the technologies are to be encouraged by socialists. Would 
not socialists want to  defy a technological trend which compartmentalises 
each family unit? Would we want t o  encourage the working from home 
via computer terminals which is on the horizon for many people, 
especially women? Would we not wish to reconstitute technologies that 
reflect and encourage more communal values? 
(c) The Priorities of the IT industry 
Kevin Robins and myself have described elsewhere the IT industry,53 so 
here I can state briefly that it is a fast-growing business, dominated by an 
oligopoly of multi-billion dollar transnationals at  the head of which are 
IBM and AT&T, that is rapidly changing amidst intensive competition over 
markets, standards and product innovation between these giants which 
increasingly offer proprietary ranges of complementary and compatible 
technologies. Though their focus is mainly on computer communications 
systems for the office, the IT industry is so vast and is so rapidly inte- 
grating and converging that very many enormous corporate bodies in 
media, telecommunications, electronics, computing and information 
supply are entering the arena to struggle for mastery over the emerging 
'information grid'. 
These IT corporations work on a number of assumptions. One is that 
they are answerable to no-one bllt their shareholders (and not much to the 
bulk of these) whose priority is profit maximisation. In pursuit of this goal 
all the major companies have identified business users as the most likely 
to offer a satisfactory return on investment. Fulfilling a policy of servicing 
the most lucrative markets in order to  achieve the best possible profit has 
significantly influenced the technologies that have emerged. To believe that 
computer communications for business users, far and away the most 
sought after market, are neutral developments is untenable given the 
prioritlsation of this area by the manufacturers and their clients. 
The reality is that these are systems developed to 'serve the inter- 
corporate needs for which they were designed'.54 Computer terminals in 
banks and travel agencies, communications networks linking company 
sites, data processing centres and the like have been pioneered, produced 
404 THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1985186 
and marketed for identifiable social needs, those of commercial enter- 
prises, and it is surely reasonable to suggest that a different constituency 
and different manufacturers might produce different technologies. It is 
only by closing our minds to  the possibility of alternative technologies 
that we can assume as uncontentious the results of the stress of IT cor- 
porations on the 'electronic grid' within and between offices and thereby 
resign ourselves to displacement of staff, increased machine pacing of 
work, and concentrated power of the already powerful. 
(d) IT for the Militay and Police 
Military and police agencies have a keen interest in information. IT offers 
them the opportunity of handling more information more effectively, 
and they are big spending organisations (military procurement expenditure 
in Britain was about L8 billion in 1984-85). In light of this, there should 
be no surprise that IT manufacturers all have substantial commitments to 
produce equipment and software to  meet the needs of these organs of the 
state. Though precise figures are hard to  come by, NED0 recently declared 
that 'the UK electronics industry's single biggest customer is the Ministry 
of Defence'" and there is widespread agreement among analysts that 
military sales on average account for about 20% of corporate revenue in 
the b~siness. '~ At the higher levels companies such as British Aerospace 
get around half their income from the Ministry of Defence, but no IT 
corporation of significance got less than L25 million from the Ministry 
in 1981-82 and Ferranti, GEC and Plessey occupied the top category of 
'over El00 million'." More pertinent, 70% of these contracts are non- 
competitively allocated and are often a t  the cutting edge of technological 
advance, making them especially attractive to IT corporations. A recent 
report that the Commons Public Accounts Committee has 'no way of 
knowing what proportion of the L5,000 million spent by the Ministry of 
Defence on non-competitive contracts is being paid out in legitimate 
expenditure and how much is spent on inflated bills with items disguised 
t o  boost profits' (Guardian, 1 3  May, 1985) does nothing to diminish that 
attraction. Indeed, the military demand provides a constantly renewed 
energy for ever more sophisticated computer communications techno- 
logies-any system is outdated before it is completed-and thereby a 
reliable outlet for IT  manufacturer^.^^ 
The outcome is the creation of mind-boggling military technologies59 
and an apparently inexorable growth of increasingly integrated police 
computer networks and data banks, local, regional and nationaL60 Readers 
will not require a rehearsal of the dangers these technologies carry in 
international affairs and at home, dangers of confrontation and warfare 
and erosion of civil liberties. The least that one can say is that much of 
the IT for the military and police is devoted to surveillance of the 'enemy' 
within and without (spy satellites, telephone interception, 'bugs', con- 
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struction of dossiers on 'subversives' and so on), and that, amid the 
economic crisis, social upheaval and restructuring through which we are 
living, a strategy of strong state/free market6' leads easily to  opposition 
to government policies being equated with subversion. 
What could socialists want with these technologies? With their illiberal 
values of spying and prying these surely cannot be seen as worthy of 
inheritance. It has been suggested that at least some elements of police 
data networks are worth saving, for example files on missing persons and 
stolen vehicles. I could concede this were the systems publicly accountable, 
but with two provisoes. The first is that to  talk in this way is to  overlook 
the motive for and context of their introduction which places to the fore 
the policing function as one of containing social unrest in often highly 
charged political and industrial circumstances (thus during the miners' 
strike entries on the Police National Computer's Stolen and Suspect 
Vehicle Index jumped 50% as police logged miners' cars used for picket- 
ing). The second, related, is that the idea that technology can be salvaged 
underestimates how much the design of these systems, especially the soft- 
ware which is the biggest expense, is customised in ways that make it 
difficult to  put to  other purposes. 
The Politicisation of Technology 
What this discussion amounts to  is that the Left should stop asking what 
TECHNOLOGY can do and concentrate instead on what particular 
technologies are doing and why they are doing it. We should focus on 
technologies in the here and now so we may show how they can serve 
powerful interests and how their origin and application are shaped by 
those interests. A stress on 'present tense technologies' is a prerequisite for 
strengthening the resolve of those who often have good reason to oppose 
'progress', yet are shaken in their actions by insistence on technology's 
neutrality and beneficence. This idea seems wilfully blind to  the fact that 
many of the Left's problems emanate from and/or are exacerbated by 
technological innovations that displace employees, boost the speed of 
work, deskill labour, increase the national and international dominance of 
corporate capital, threaten global stability still more than it is already 
threatened, heighten surveillance and facilitate the dissemination of 
ideas and values from and favourable to the powerful. We on the Left 
should try to  change our own and others terms of reference about techno- 
logy, we should insist on a different type of debate, that those weakened 
by its applications can resist without feeling that they are cranks. 
But how should we effect this? Astraightforward and grandiose response 
is that a socialist policy for technology would not be so different from a 
socialist policy towards the economy, welfare or class, in that it would 
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seek to apply socialist criteria of egalitarianism, community and support 
for the working class. Nonetheless, it would differ radically from previous 
and present socialist policies by applying socialist principles to technology 
instead of treating technology as an autonomous and a social phenomenon 
which gives off 'wealth' that can be distributed in a variety of ways. In 
other words, a socialist technology policy would insist that socialism does 
not stop at  the door of a room occupied by experts who in time create 
manifold 'goodies' which are then passed to  the outsiders. Socialism enters 
that door, does its utmost to make known to  the widest possible public 
what is going on inside, and tries to impose its priorities on the technologists 
and their produce. 
Suggesting this, we are able to see that a problem for the Left is that it 
is forced to respond to  technologies already constituted. While it is irnport- 
ant  to lay bare the interests represented in these completed technologies, 
the Left should also be arguing that the processes by which modern 
technologies are created, research and development projects, require 
politicisation and debate so that priorities established before the pro- 
duction of technologies are open to  scrutiny and influence. At the moment 
the controllers of R&D funds, those who decide to back one idea rather 
than another and thereby set the agenda for consideration of tomorrow's 
technologies today, are of two kinds, corporate capital and state agencies. 
The sums they invest are prodigious: for example, between 1977-82 IBM 
spent $8 billion on R&D, ITT spent $5 billion from 1978-83, and Bell 
Labs (of AT&T) in 1982 alone spent $2 billion on its 25,000 research 
staff, while in Britain the Ministry of Defence in 1983 disposed of half of 
all the government's R&D funds (and the state provided 50% of all the 
nation's R&D spending). 
No-one can be under the illusion that these projects, at the point of 
origination of technologies, are not influenced by particular values and 
beliefs. Just a glance a t  the heated debates within companies and govern- 
ment departments over research priorities gives the lie to that. A task of 
the Left is to enter the debate about technological innovation at this 
early stage. There is certainly room for it now in the area of state expen- 
diture, given that so much of it is channelled through publicly owned, 
though scarcely accountable, institutions such as universities and colleges. 
Doubtless such a proposal would be met with outraged cries that academic 
freedom and the scientific enterprise are threatened, but a socialist strategy 
on these lines would be doing nothing other than make explicit what has 
happened for over a century and what the present government is under- 
taking with special vigour since it feels that the inadequate response of 
higher education to capital has contributed to its demise. If, taking a leaf 
out of Thatcher's book, the Left can move towards imposing its criteria 
for technologies at the point of initiation and origination, to present at 
this stage its notions of need, quality of work, and modes of leisure, then 
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it will have moved far from the inheritor approach to received technologies, 
towards one which regards them as expressive of social  relation^.^' 
Such advocacy is concerned, of course, with a socialist policy for 
technology which is long term. A much more pressing question is what 
to do with the technologies that are here now and with which any socialist 
enterprise must come to terms. Socialism will not start with a clean iheet 
and i t  will be compelled to  use technologies already in place. Still more to  
the point, socialists have to make clear their policies on technologies now 
being applied, so it is important to outline the contours of a socialist 
technology policy that is relevant to present conditions. 
This is territory that the Left has not yet charted-and a priority should 
be to  commence this task-and I can only suggest a few landmarks, but, 
perhaps most prominently, socialists should mark their willingness to  
support resistance to  technologies, introduced in the name of 'progress' 
because they increase 'productivity' and 'efficiency' at  the expense of 
'competitors', which make redundant, deskill or increase. the pace of 
work for employees. Socialists should unhesitatingly back the victims of 
technoIogica1 changes wrought by capital and they must refuse the tempta- 
tion to qualify their support by whispering, for example, that 'though we 
support printers in their struggle against media corporations which are 
endeavouring to  reduce their numbers, nowadays they are an anachronism 
-under socialism we'll be using the most advanced printing technologies 
ourselves and they don't require printers, but we'll give compensation 
enough to allow the dispossessed to  enjoy a life of leisure'. 
It is this sort of reasoning, which subscribes to an underlying, apolitical, 
process of technological progress, that gravely weakens efforts to  combat 
the increased control of capital being effected in the here and now. The 
only acceptable socialist policy should be support for the opponents of 
technologies which do them down and an insistence that the socialist 
endeavour will extend to  a radical revision of technological adaptation 
and the production of technologies themselves. 
A related principle should be a willingness to refuse technologies that 
are inimical to  socialist ideals. Most socialists appear to regard rejection of 
new machines as some sort of blasphemy, at best a yearning for a mythical 
yesterday, and at  worst an assault on rationality itself. But what is wrong 
with refusing the products of electronic warfare? Is it irresponsible to  
reject the generation of energy by nuclear fission? And is it madness to 
suggest that Britain has far too many motor cars and the ambition to have 
one (or more!) in every house is materially wasteful, antisocial, and 
damaging of the countryside? Is it absurd to  say that Concorde-beautiful 
engineering though it undoubtedly is-is a waste of resources, material and 
human, and should long since have been abandoned? And is it foolish to 
claim that high-rise accommodation for families is unacceptable to 
socialists, and the only sensible socialist policy is t o  urge the demolition 
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of such buildings? 
A socialist technology policy would not banish current technologies 
just because they have been created by capitalism. To argue that socialists 
should beware the fiction that technology is neutral is not the same as 
endorsing the nonsense that capitalist technologies can be rejected out of 
hand. What it should insist upon, however, is a suspicion of capitalist 
technologies, a preparedness to change or even to reject them, and an 
insistence that the criteria for their adoption will be socialist priorities 
rather than technical wizardry. 
More positively, a socialist policy towards technology would feel an 
impulse to adopt an ecocentric outlook which is intensely suspicious of 
the technocratic mind that urges unlimited 'growth' and the 'technical fix' 
as solution to problems.63 A high priority for socialist technologies would 
surely be that they are not ecologically or socially damaging: that they 
conserve energy and wherever possible favour using renewable resources 
such as wind, sun and wave rather than coal and oil; that they are non- 
polluting of the environment; that they encourage the craft elements of 
labour rather than provoke an intense division of labour in the name of 
efficiency of output. . . 
I t  is very likely that such measures will be less 'efficient' than current 
technologies, but socialists should be able to resist too rapid an 
acquiescence to the pressure for 'more' at  least cost. One major way of 
doing this is to discuss and thoroughly debate what socialist needs are 
and how they are to  be ranked. Here it is important to remind ourselves 
that, in a capitalist society, need is determined by the saleability of an 
object and provided on the basis of ability to pay. Socialists would obviously 
want to change this, but they are still left with the imperative of deciding 
upon what would be needed by a socialist society. 
I t  seems rare for the Left to consider need as a problem for socialism. 
Concerned overwhelmingly as they are with deprivation and injustice, 
socialists have an impulse to  shout out for radical redistribution of what is 
available and the creation of still more to be shared in the future. I t  is 
the same perception which regards committed ecologists with suspicion: 
too often these appear to  be people who, already having well-paid and 
secure jobs, good homes and affluent lifestyles, want to restrict what 
working class people have and aspire to have. Against this, however, it 
has to be conceded by socialists that the ecologists' emphasis that in 
contemporary Britain almost the whole population lives in a condition of 
'post-scarcity', living in ways far beyond elemental needs of food, clothing 
and housing, is valid. Acknowledgement of this demands that we socialists 
ask ourselves and one another what is needed by socialism. 
Socialists should insist that high on their list of needs are not only 
finished goods (carpets, fridges and the like), but also the quality of work 
experience and social interaction, a clean environment, and aesthetic 
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pleasure, and meeting these needs might well be at  the expense of an 
accountant's measure of efficiency. The establishment of socialist priorities 
here would throw up no end of difficulties of, for example, matching 
rewarding work with required level of output, but at the least it should 
allow us to jettison the futurist (dis)utopia of robotised production leaving 
people to indulge in purposeless idleness in an electronic Cockaigne. 
In deciding upon socialist needs the question must be posed: does 
fulfilment of them cause injustices or create impediments to the socialist 
enterprise? For example, would satisfaction of requirements for certain 
foods or beverages have a deleterious effect on the economies of the Third 
World? If i t  does, then the damage caused must be put into the balance to  
help gauge the weight of particular needs, and it may be that, in the light 
of such considerations, socialists would decide that certain needs cannot 
be met. 
This relation between socialist needs and the means of satisfying them 
is a vexed one with which technology is intimately linked. Under capital- 
ism the meeting of market-defined needs characteristically breeds alienation 
for the worker who is compelled to endure machine-paced and unskilled 
labour. Any socialism worth its salt would reject both these ends and 
means, but it could still be forced to  face difficulties of reconciling its 
socialist goals and the means of meeting them. For instance, if one accepts 
that household refuse must be collected (it could be possible to arrange 
for individual disposal via a sewage-type system or even incineration), i t  
is reasonable to  argue that this task is inherently unpleasant (dirty, with 
dangers of infection). Therefore, runs a familiar anti-socialist refrain, 
alienating work (and inequality) is assured by the technical imperative of 
removing garbage. This does not have to  be the case. For the limited 
number of jobs that are deemed essential and unpleasant, a socialist 
society would surely want to  do two things. First, i t  would set t o  in order 
to  produce technologies that make the task less onerous; second, it would 
propose to introduce a form of 'communal service' by which each citizen 
is obliged, for a period of their lives, t o  undertake such duties. 
Finally, socialists might wish to  break with technologies that lead to  
users being overdependent, by favouring the production of machines 
which, if less exotic, can be repaired with minimal training. This advocacy 
is to  point to the ways in which many modern technologies, even those 
performing rudimentary tasks (for example, coffee grinders, typewriters, 
lawn mowers, food mixers), defy home repair because they are con- 
sciously designed that way (examples are legion, ranging from automobiles 
to  televisions, and everyone is familiar nowadays with proprietary warn- 
ings not to  attempt one's own repair). A socialist technology policy, 
deliberately aimed at giving maximum authority to the individual and 
minimising reliance on experts, would surely urge that this 'technological 
illiteracy' is combated by developing machines that are easily repaired 
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when things go wrong. 
There are other priorities socialists might wish to establish as criteria for 
the acceptance and guidance of technology-technologies that reflect 
communal rather than private living (e.g. public rather than private transit 
systems), technologies that encourage decentralisation rather than con- 
centration of power. . .-and my comments are only a start. They are, 
however, a necessary stage in the development of a socialist policy which 
is genuinely applicable to technology. 
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